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Abstract
In this manuscript, we describe the identification of highly pathogenic bacteria using an assay coupling biothreat group-
specific PCR with electrospray ionization mass spectrometry (PCR/ESI-MS) run on an Ibis PLEX-ID high-throughput platform.
The biothreat cluster assay identifies most of the potential bioterrorism-relevant microorganisms including Bacillus
anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Yersinia pestis, Burkholderia mallei and pseudomallei, Brucella species, and Coxiella burnetii.
DNA from 45 different reference materials with different formulations and different concentrations were chosen and sent to
a service screening laboratory that uses the PCR/ESI-MS platform to provide a microbial identification service. The standard
reference materials were produced out of a repository built up in the framework of the EU funded project ‘‘Establishment of
Quality Assurances for Detection of Highly Pathogenic Bacteria of Potential Bioterrorism Risk’’ (EQADeBa). All samples were
correctly identified at least to the genus level.
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Introduction
Highly pathogenic bacteria can often cause infectious zoonotic
diseases and even large outbreaks in the human and animal
population. A number of these agents have the potential for, or
have been used, in bioterrorist attacks [1–3]. The intentional
release of infectious agents can result in serious public health
consequences as shown by the anthrax episodes in the USA in
2001. Rapid and reliable laboratory detection and confirmation
strategies for potential bioterrorism agents contribute to reducing
the health risk and improving emergency response and public
health control initiatives [4].
In case of deliberately or naturally occurring pathogens, the
agent must be identified as rapidly as possible to allow measures to
be taken to prevent spread and to ensure proper treatment of
casualties. In addition, unknown materials accompanied by
declarations threatening individual persons, organizations, or
events must be analyzed rapidly. In both these scenarios, the
assay used must be able to identify a broad panel of potential
threat microorganisms, possibly in a background matrix that is
contaminated with non-pathogenic bacteria or viruses in order to
exclude or confirm the presence of a biological threat.
A number of bacterial pathogens were classified by CDC
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) as category A and B
comprising the highest concern for use in bioterrorist attacks [2,5].
The categories include bacterial agents such as Bacillus anthracis,
Francisella tularensis, Yersinia pestis, Burkholderia mallei and pseudomallei,
Brucella species, and Coxiella burnetii. These microorganisms also
cause naturally occurring diseases in animals and humans. In most
European countries, the natural prevalence of these pathogens is
low, although, from time to time some of the pathogens, e.g.
F. tularensis, Brucella spp., or C. burnetii cause outbreaks in animal
and human populations. Low disease prevalence and low di-
agnostic demands are probably the main reasons why existing
diagnostic and detection assays are almost not commercially
available for this group of zoonotic diseases. Existing diagnostic
and detection assays for highly pathogenic bacteria are primarily
based on classical microbiological and on molecular and
immunological methods, mainly developed as in-house assays.
Some multiplex assays have been designed to simplify and shorten
the period of identification for pathogens responsible for infectious
diseases. However, a highly sensitive yet broadly inclusive
approach for the identification of all bacteria under suspicion is
not yet available. In addition, due to the lack of reference samples
for clinical as well as environmental samples, it is often difficult to
validate and determine the accuracy of broad-spectrum assays.
An interesting approach for a complete identification of a large
number of microorganisms is the Ibis PLEX-ID technology
offered by Abbott [6–8]. This technology is based on polymerase
chain reaction/electrospray ionization-mass spectrometry (PCR/
ESI-MS). A number of primer pairs are used to amplify nucleic
acid markers from a wide variety of organisms, followed by an
analysis of PCR amplicons using mass spectrometry. The analysis
of precise masses of these amplicons allows the calculation of the
base compositions of the PCR products; these base compositions
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or pathogens. This platform provides a broad infectious disease
detection capability and has been used for the detection of bacteria
and viruses from a variety of different sources [7,9–12]. In the
accompanying manuscript, Sampath et al. [21] describe an
approach for the identification of most relevant biothreat agent
groups, the so called ‘‘biothreat cluster assay’’, for the PLEX-ID
that uses 36 multiplexed primer pairs for detection of biothreat
agents. The biothreat cluster assay was validated by analysis of
a broad collection of biothreat organisms and near neighbors
prepared by spiking biothreat nucleic acids into nucleic acids
extracted from filtered environmental air. The biothreat assay
detects 28 NIAID (National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases) priority pathogens [13] and 18 HHS/USDA (United
States Department of Health and Human Services/United States
Department of Agriculture) select agents [14].
In the framework of the European Union (EU) funded project
‘‘Establishment of Quality Assurances for Detection of Highly
Pathogenic Bacteria’’ (EQADeBa) we assembled a repository of
the bacterial pathogens mentioned above which we then used to
produce standardized reference material. The EQADeBa project
provides the infrastructure and the design, the organization, and
the management of an external quality assurance (EQA) scheme
for potential bioterrorism agents (European Commission, EAHC –
Agreement nu - 2007 204). The project includes designing and
implementing practical proficiency tests for the detection of
bacterial agents of CDC category A and B. Standardized reference
materials have been prepared in different formulations, sometimes
as mixed cultures and in different concentrations for these
exercises. We used material from two proficiency tests, from
which 45 different samples were chosen after DNA-preparation for
analysis using the biothreat cluster assay and the PLEX-ID
technology. All samples were correctly identified as described
below.
Materials and Methods
Bacterial Cultivation
The bacterial strains used are listed in Table 1 and Table 2.
Strains from the EQADeBa repository were plated on blood agar
plates with the exception of Francisella sp. which was plated on
cysteine heart agar (QUELAB, Quebec, Canada). The identity of
all used strains was verified by appropriate microbiological and
molecular methods. Strains were cultivated under appropriate
biosafety level (BSL) 2 or 3 standards. After sterility testing,
inactivated suspension or DNA produced under BSL3 conditions
were handled under BSL2 conditions. Inactivated cells from
C. burnetii were kindly provided by Georg Baljer (Justus-Liebig-
Universita ¨t, Gießen, Germany).
‘‘DNA Samples’’
15 DNA samples were directly prepared from bacterial cultures
and used as reference material (Table 1). Total DNA was purified
according to a modified protocol for Gram-negative bacteria using
the QIAGEN DNeasy Blood and Tissue kit (Hilden, Germany).
Rather than harvest cells from broth media, bacteria from agar
plate were inoculated directly into 180 ml ATL buffer. After
adding 20 ml proteinase K, we incubated 90 minutes at 56uC
followed by adding 200 ml AL buffer for 10 minutes at 70uC. To
avoid cross contamination we mixed all samples only by pipetting
and added extra centrifugation steps between heat incubation
steps. After at least one week of sterility testing, DNA concentra-
tions were measured using the nanodrop 8000 (peqlab Biotechno-
logie GmbH, Erlangen, Germany). Dilutions of DNA were carried
out to 10
6 copies/ml using AE buffer. The mean values of three
DNAs of each bacterium were used to estimate the genome
equivalents. Each bacterial DNA was analyzed by real-time PCR
to ensure that no cross-contamination had occurred.
Inactivation of Bacterial Samples
To prepare reference materials, each bacterial species was
inoculated into PBS to a density of approx. OD600=1.0 directly
from colonies of agar culture media. To estimate the colony
forming units (cfu) of each suspension, dilutions were plated onto
blood agar plates (or cysteine heart agar plates for F. tularensis).
Each sample was tested in duplicate. Bacterial suspensions were
inactivated by heating at 60uC for at least 22 h. The exception was
B. anthracis which was treated by 1% peracetic acid for 30 min with
subsequent washing. All inactivated suspensions were checked for
sterility by one tenth of each volume over 14 days. After
inactivation, cell numbers in each suspension were determined
using a counting chamber and real-time PCR. Suspensions of all
inactivated samples were analyzed for cross contamination with
other target bacteria by real-time PCR and by immunological
methods (direct immune fluorescence and ELISA).
Preparation of ‘‘Inactivated Bacteria Samples’’
Six different matrices were chosen to spike with the different
inactivated bacteria (Table 2): 1) PBS as a substitute for isolate
samples (Iso), 2) inactivated mouse hybridoma cells (Ag8) with
a concentration of 2610
6 /ml as a surrogate for the tissue samples
(Tiss), 3) autoclaved and sterile filtrated natural water from river
‘‘Spree’’ (Env-1 through Env-5), 4) autoclaved water from lake
‘‘Plo ¨tzensee’’ as matrix for the environmental samples (Env-6
through Env-10), 5) a reduced-fat, pasteurized and homogenized
milk served as a substitute for the food samples (Food), and 6) fetal
bovine serum from Invitrogen/Gibco (lot# 41A1268K) was used
as surrogate for the clinical samples (Clin). Each bacterial
suspension was diluted 1:10 with the corresponding matrix. Each
set of vials for the environmental samples Env-6 to Env-10 and for
the food as well as for the clinical samples contained two different
target bacteria with two different concentrations. Additionally,
each matrix was included as a negative control (Table 2).
Preparation of DNA from ‘‘Inactivated Bacteria Samples’’
and PLEX-ID Analyses
DNA was isolated from ‘‘Inactivated Bacteria samples’’ using
the QIAGEN DNeasy Blood and Tissue kit according to the
protocol for Gram-negative bacteria. A total of 45 samples, 30
samples with approx. 100 ml DNA out of the ‘‘Inactivated Bacteria
samples’’ and the 15 ‘‘DNA samples’’ were sent for analyses to
AthoGen [15], a service screening laboratory that uses the PCR/
ESI-MS platform to provide a microbial identification service.
PCR was performed in a 50 mL reaction volume containing 5 mL
nucleic acid extract in a reaction mix as previously described [9].
One-step real time (RT)-PCR was performed in wells that targeted
viral detection. Reverse transcription PCR cycling conditions were
used for both RT-PCR and PCR reactions according to previously
described methods [7,10–12]. Samples and reaction components
were aliquoted into PLEX-ID biothreat cluster assay (Cat.
No. 03N35-63) plates using a Janus Automated Workstation.
One 96 well plate allows to analyze six samples in parallel, means
16 wells per sample. Thermocycling was carried out on an
Eppendorf Mastercycler. After thermocycling, plates were stored
at –40uC until the samples could be analyzed by ESI/MS. After
PCR amplification, 30 mL aliquots of each PCR reaction were
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described [6,10].
Data Analysis and Results Reporting
Data analysis and results reporting was performed as described
in Sampath et. al. [21]. Briefly, a customized reporting rule set was
designed that allowed rapid and accurate detection of the
biothreat targets. The biothreat assay report provides data
obtained using 36 primer pairs. Each of the threat clusters is
treated independently and the results are reported for each cluster
separately. Mixed detections of two or more threats or a threat
with an unrelated near neighbor in another group are also
reported. The system is also capable of reporting organism/strain
level matches based on the genomic sequence data in the PLEX-
ID database. This is provided as a research utility tool in a separate
analysis workstation. Additional details for each of the matches,
including the detected base compositions, Q-scores and levels, are
available using this report and are described in the accompanying
manuscript.
Results
The PLEX-ID biothreat cluster assay (Ibis Biosciences,
Carlsbad, CA) described in the accompanying manuscript by
Sampath et al. [21] provides the capacity to analyze samples for
targets as B. anthracis, Y. pestis, F. tularensis, Vibrio cholerae, C. burnetii,
as well as Rickettsia, and Orthopoxvirus or Filovirus. The 36 primer
pairs used in the assay are multiplexed such that 16 wells on a 96-
well plate are required per sample; six samples can be analyzed in
parallel on a single plate. The PLEX-ID assay system correctly
identified, with one exception, all of the 45 unknown samples
targeting highly pathogenic bacteria, using DNA template from
these organisms (Table 1, DNA-12). In one case, Brucella abortus
was recognized as Brucella melitensis. At the same time, samples
containing B. melitensis were analyzed correctly (Table 1: DNA-8;
Table 2: Food-2, Food-5).
In analyses of ‘‘DNA samples’’ and spiked ‘‘Inactivated Bacteria
samples’’ containing Burkholderia, B. mallei (Table 1: DNA-13;
Table 2: Clin-3, Clin-4) could not be discriminated from B.
pseudomallei. Further, signatures for some isolates of B. pseudomallei
(Table 1: DNA-10; Table 2: Env-7, Env-8) could not be
differentiated from Burkholderia xenovorans (Table 1: DNA-10;
Table 2: Env-7, Env-8). This might be a problem for risk
assessment because B. pseudomallei is classified in risk group 3,
whereas B. xenovorans is classified in risk group 1 and is not
pathogenic for humans or animals. This limitation has been
described by Sampath et. al. Interestingly, samples containing
Burkholderia thailandensis (risk group 1), the nearest relative of B.
pseudomallei, were clearly identified (Table 1: DNA-4; Table 2: Iso-
4, Tiss-2, Env-4).
Different samples containing F. tularensis were always identified
correctly at the species level (Table 1: DNA-2, DNA-11; Table 2:
Iso-3, Tiss-1; Env-5, Clin-1, Clin-2), but there is no differentiation
between the subspecies in the species summary reporting. Since
strain differentiation would be of interest because subsp. tularensis,
subsp. holarctica, and subsp. mediasiatica cause tularemia in humans,
whereas subsp. novicida shows a low virulence and causes very
rarely disease in immune-compromised individuals. In this case,
a secondary data evaluation would be offered by the PLEX-ID
platform using appropriate software that contains detailed sub-
species information, and researchers should use this offer if
a Francisella subspecies is identified. This approach was not applied
in our study. A sample comprising a distinct Francisella species,
Francisella philomiragia, was correctly identified (Table 1: DNA-7).
Several samples analyzed contained identical bacteria with
different quantities. There was reasonable agreement between
Table 1. ‘‘DNA samples’’ for the bacterial strains with DNA concentrations and estimated genome equivalents used, as well as
results given by the PLEX-ID technology with genomes per well and Q-score.
Code of ‘‘DNA
samples’’ Decoding: Organism/Strain
Mean value of DNA
concentration [ng/ml]
Genome
equivalents [GE/ml]
Organism detected
with PLEX-ID
Level
(Genomes/
Well) Q-Score
DNA-1 E. coli/A002-43 Le10 9,23 1,68610
6 E. coli not H7/No
BZ present
1339 1.00
DNA-2 F. tularensis subsp. tularensis/Ft 12 12,30 5,93610
6 F. tularensis * 1492 1.00
DNA-3 B. anthracis/Jena DU III-7 11,63 1,99610
6 B. anthracis * 1368 1.00
DNA-4 B. thailandensis/DSM 13276 9,65 1,31610
6 B. thailandensis * 1628 1.00
DNA-5 Y. pestis/03-1501 12,77 2,53610
6 Y. pestis 1251 1.00
DNA-6 C. burnetii/Nine Mile RSA 493 13,10 5,98610
6 C. burnetii * 456 1.00
DNA-7 F. philomiragia/DSM 7535 18,67 8,33610
6 F. philomiragia * 742 0.97
DNA-8 B. melitensis/16M 12,50 3,47610
6 B. melitensis * 1344 1.00
DNA-9 B. thurigiensis/DSM 350 24,27 4,22610
6 B. thuringiensis/cereus * 1303 0.98
DNA-10 B. pseudomallei/HO 3460-0149 10,05 1,27610
6 B. pseudomallei/
xenovorans *
1038 1.00
DNA-11 F. tularensis subsp. holarctica/ATCC
29684
19,73 9,50610
6 F. tularensis * 1459 1.00
DNA-12 B. abortus/544 10,85 3,02610
6 B. melitensis * 1308 1.00
DNA-13 B. mallei/ATCC 23344 8,30 1,30610
6 B. mallei/pseudomallei * 1173 1.00
DNA-14 Y. pseudotuberculosis/A002-49 Le9 21,03 4,08610
6 Y. pseudotuberculosis 1055 1.00
DNA-15 B. cereus/DSM 31 9,05 1,53610
6 B. thuringiensis/cereus * 1345 0.98
*E. coli was also found in these samples with a Q-score of 1.00.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039928.t001
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counting of bacteria in counting cell chambers and the ‘‘Genomes
per well’’ calculated by PLEX-ID technology based on a calibrant
in the assay wells for B. pseudomallei (Env-7 and Env-8), Y. pestis
(Env-9 and Env-10), F. tularensis (Clin-1 and Clin-2), B. melitensis
(Food-2 and Food-5), and B. mallei (Clin-3 and Clin-4). No
significant difference in quantities of B. anthracis present in samples
Food-1 and Food-3 was observed using the PLEX-ID technology
although previous counting in the sample preparation process
revealed a 10-fold difference.
The closely related species Y. pestis and Yersinia pseudotuberculosis
as well as B. anthracis and other Bacillus cereus-group strains were
correctly identified using the PLEX-ID biothreat cluster assay.
Bacillus thuringiensis and B. cereus were not differentiated (Table 1:
Table 2. ‘‘Inactivated Bacterial samples’’ in different matrices used, as well as results given by the PLEX-ID technology with
genomes per well and Q-score.
Code of
‘‘Inactivated
Bacteria
samples’’ Decoding: Organisms/Strains Matrix
Estimated cells
per ml (counting
chamber)
Organism detected
with PLEX-ID
Level
(Genomes/
Well) Q-Score
Iso -1 Y. pestis/03-1506 PBS 3610
8 Y. pestis 1140 1.00
Iso-2 B. anthracis/UD III-7 PBS 4610
6 B. anthracis * 1390 1.00
Iso-3 F. tularensis subsp. holarctica/ATCC
29684
PBS 2610
9 F. tularensis * 1492 1.00
Iso-4 B. thailandensis/DSM 13276 PBS 3610
8 B. thailandensis * 924 1.00
Iso-5 Negative control PBS 0 F. tularensis * 288 1.00
Tiss-1 F. tularensis subsp. holarctica/ATCC
29684
mouse hybridoma cells 2610
9 F. tularensis * 1490 1.00
Tiss-2 B. thailandensis/DSM 13276 mouse hybridoma cells 3610
8 B. thailandensis * 865 1.00
Tiss-3 Negative control mouse hybridoma cells 0 E. coli 1114 1.00
Tiss-4 B. anthracis/UD III-7 mouse hybridoma cells 4610
6 B. anthracis * 1303 1.00
Tiss-5 Y. pestis/03-1506 mouse hybridoma cells 3610
8 Y. pestis 1334 1.00
Env-1 B. anthracis/UD III-7 river water 4610
6 B. anthracis * 1828 1.00
Env-2 Negative control river water 0 E. coli 1596 1.00
Env-3 Y. pestis/03-1506 river water 3610
8 Y. pestis 1179 1.00
Env-4 B. thailandensis/DSM 13276 river water 3610
8 B. thailandensis * 1095 1.00
Env-5 F. tularensis subsp. holarctica/ATCC
29684
river water 2610
9 F. tularensis * 1492 1.00
Env-6 Negative control lake water 0 B. vietnamensis,
E. coli
217
1378
1.00
1.00
Env-7 B. pseudomallei/HO 3460-0149 lake water 1610
8 B. pseudomallei/xenovorans * 927 1.00
Env-8 B. pseudomallei/HO 3460-0149 lake water 1610
6 B. pseudomallei/xenovorans 517 1.00
Env-9 Y. pestis/03-1506 lake water 1610
8 Y. pestis 3615 1.00
Env-10 Y. pestis/03-1506 lake water 1610
6 Y. pestis 2847 1.00
Food-1 B. anthracis/UD III-7 milk 1610
5 B. anthracis
C burnetii *
1223
1870
1.00
0.98
Food-2 B. melitensis/16M milk 1610
9 B. melitensis
C. burnetii *
1482
754
1.00
0.98
Food-3 B. anthracis/UD III-7 milk 1610
6 B. anthracis
C. burnetii *
1283
38
1.00
1.00
Food-4 Negative control milk 0 E. coli
C. burnetii
C. perfringens
2413
2555
105
1.00
0.98
0.93
Food-5 B. melitensis/16M milk 1610
7 C. burnetii
B. melitensis *
1160
165
0.98
0.88
Clin-1 F. tularensis subsp. holarctica/
ATCC 29684
fetal calf serum 1610
9 F. tularensis * 1494 1.00
Clin-2 F. tularensis subsp. holarctica/
ATCC 29684
fetal calf serum 1610
6 F. tularensis 1271 1.00
Clin-3 B. mallei/ATCC 23344 fetal calf serum 1610
6 B. mallei/pseudomallei * 413 0.97
Clin-4 B. mallei/ATCC 23344 fetal calf serum 1610
8 B. mallei/pseudomallei * 1021 1.00
Clin-5 Negative Control fetal calf serum 0 E. coli 756 1.00
*E. coli was also found in these samples with a Q-score of 1.00.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039928.t002
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et. al.
There were observed some anomalous results, yelding in false
positive and false negative data or indications of potential cross-
contaminations in some of the assays. In one negative control
(Table 2: Iso-5) a low genome number of F. tularensis was detected,
partly caused by the very high concentrations of the bacteria in
some samples. The source of the contamination problem remains
to be determined. The generation of the reference material and
the DNA extraction process that were performed within the
laboratory at the Robert Koch-Institut was shown not to be the
cause of the contamination. The unexpected identification of
Clostridium perfringens in sample Food-4 (negative control milk)
should be clarified. The detection of Burkholderia vietnamensis in
sample Env-6 comprising natural lake water could be explained by
a cross reactivity or presence of naturally occurring DNA.
In addition to specific targets, C. burnetii DNA could be detected
in the commercial milk matrix. The presence of this bacterium was
confirmed by the External Quality Assurances Exercises (EQAEs)
in the framework of the EQADeBa project.
In most of the DNA samples (Table 1) and several other samples
(Table 2) traces of Escherichia coli DNA were detected. It is not
possible to evaluate retrospectively, whether this contamination
was due to the amplification or the measurement process.
In conclusion agents present in the samples can be identified
with a high level of confidence.
Discussion
The biothreat assay performed using the PLEX-ID technology
can be used to detect a broad collection of biothreat organisms and
near neighbors as described in the accompanying manuscript.
This assay uses 36 pairs of multiplexed primers to amplify bacterial
or viral DNA present in environmental or clinical samples. After
analysis of the amplicons by mass spectrometry, base counts of the
amplicons are determined. By comparison with the more than
850000 entries in the PLEX-ID database, biothreat agents present
in the sample can be identified. There are other multiplex PCR or
MALDI-TOF mass spectrometry based methods for analysis of
infectious agents [16–20]; however, these methods are less broad
than the PLEX-ID technology. The PLEX-ID approach provides
the possibility for a simultaneous differentiation of multiple
pathogens resulting in quantitative data given by ‘‘Genomes per
well’’ and the probability of correct identification calculated by the
‘‘Q-Score’’.
We used 45 samples from External Quality Assurances
Exercises (EQAEs) performed in the framework of the above-
mentioned EU project on quality assurance of the diagnosis of
highly pathogenic bacteria (EQADeBa) to evaluate the ability of
the PLEX-ID to correctly identify pathogens within this biothreat
cluster. In addition, we assessed the capability of the assay system
to differentiate between the more highly pathogenic species from
congeners that were either low or apathogenic.
In the current configuration of the instrument, DNA was
extracted in a separate step. An integrated DNA extraction step
could be helpful.
In general, the biothreat assay run on the PLEX-ID technology
had an identification rate of 100% for the highly pathogenic target
bacteria at the genus level for the 45 reference samples. With
exception of Burkholderia and in one case Brucella, all other target
bacteria could also been discriminated at the species level. In
addition to the correct and rapid identification of the target
bacterial DNA we have seen several unspecific reactions. Most
striking was the contamination with E. coli DNA. In parallel
cultures of the primary samples, E. coli was not found except
sample DNA-1 which was prepared from E. coli cultures and was
used as the source for the DNA-control samples in the first set of
experiments (Table 1, data not shown). Thus, an intrinsic
contamination during the amplification or measurement process
of the sample set must be excluded. Most unexpected results were
observed in the negative control samples, where for one negative
control a low genome number of F. tularensis was detected (Table 2:
Iso-5) and is assumed to be the result of cross-contamination.
The ability to differentiate between B. pseudomallei and B.
xerovorans would be most useful as related to potential medical
treatment decisions to be made or for the purposes of microbial
forensic analysis. Mainly for forensic questions, but also for threat
estimation the differentiation of B. mallei and pseudomallei as well as
of F. tularensis subspecies would be of interest. In addition, the
species F. tularensis contains subspecies tularensis, holarctica, and
mediasiatica, pathogenic to humans, and subspecies novicida, not
pathogenic to humans, which are also of interest to be identified.
Currently these are distinguished by the assay and details of
speciation are available only in a secondary report rather than the
primary sample report.
The PLEX-ID Genomes per well data reflects the same general
trend of quantification as the reference method; however, the
magnitudes were quite different. The PLEX-ID assays are only
semi-quantitative and Genomes per well reflects a relative measure of
the abundance as compared to the internal standard [6]. The
normal range for reporting these levels is between 0.1X and 10X
the levels of internal controls in the assay, which in the case of the
PLEX-ID biothreat assay represents a working range of ,10 GE/
well to 1000 GE/well. Above 1000 GE/well, the target organism
levels far exceed the calibrant, thus, the reported level only serves
to indicate high target concentrations. This would explain that
quantitative differences in some samples were not detected.
The PLEX-ID technology is a high-throughput technology that
allows rapid analysis of the DNA content of environmental and
clinical samples. Here we evaluated 45 samples of genomic DNA
in various matrices. The high specificity and high sensitivity of the
PLEX-ID biothreat assay reported in the accompanying manu-
script by Sampath et al. [21] was confirmed by our analysis of
these bacterial samples. An advantage of this assay is that it is
semi-generic; a wide range of bacterial agents and their near-
neighbours are identified without need for assumptions about the
pathogens present. If more than one pathogen is present in
a sample, all are identified simultaneously. The results are scored
for a probability, which allows the interpretation of uncertain
results in the context of further information. The PLEX-ID
instrument is useful for the application in central service facilities
with a high-throughput of samples.
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